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Abstract
The enforcement of access control policies using cryptography has received considerable
attention in recent years and the security of such enforcement schemes is increasingly well
understood. Recent work in the area has considered the efficient enforcement of temporal and
geo-spatial access control policies, and asymptotic results for the time and space complexity
of efficient enforcement schemes have been obtained. However, for practical purposes, it is
useful to have explicit bounds for the complexity of enforcement schemes.
In this paper, we consider interval-based access control policies, of which temporal and geo-
spatial access control policies are special cases. We define enforcement schemes for interval-
based access control policies for which it is possible, in almost all cases, to obtain exact values
for the schemes’ complexity, thereby subsuming a substantial body of work in the literature.
Moreover, our enforcement schemes are more practical than existing schemes, in the sense
that they operate in the same way as standard cryptographic enforcement schemes, unlike
other efficient schemes in the literature. The main difference between our approach and
earlier work is that we develop techniques that are specific to the cryptographic enforcement
of interval-based access control policies, rather than applying generic techniques that give rise
to complex constructions and asymptotic bounds.
1 Introduction
In some situations, we may wish to use cryptographic techniques to enforce some form of access
control. Such an approach is useful when data objects have the following characteristics: read
often, by many users; written once, or rarely, by the owner of the data; and transmitted over un-
protected networks. Fu, Kamara, and Kohno (2006) identify content distribution networks, such
as Akami and BitTorrent, as applications where some kind of cryptographic access control is par-
ticularly suitable. In such circumstances, protected data (objects) are encrypted and authorized
users are given the appropriate cryptographic keys. When cryptographic enforcement is used, the
problem we must address is the efficient and accurate distribution of encryption keys to authorized
users.
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of interest in key encrypting or key
assignment schemes. In such schemes, a user is given a secret value – typically a single key –
which enables the user to derive some collection of encryption keys which decrypt the objects for
which she is authorized. Key derivation is performed using the secret value and some information
made publicly available by the scheme administrator. The two objectives when designing such
a scheme are to minimize the amount of public information and the time required to derive a
key. Unsurprisingly, it is not possible to realize both objectives simultaneously, so trade-offs have
been sought. Crampton, Martin, and Wild (2006) provide a survey of, and taxonomy for, key
assignment schemes, and the various factors that affect the parameters described above.
At the same time, we have seen the development of access control models in which
time plays an important role in deciding whether access requests are authorized or
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not (Bertino, Bonatti, and Ferrari 2001). One particular application of such “temporal ac-
cess control” systems is the protection of data that is made available periodically as
(part of) a subscription-based service (Bertino, Carminati, and Ferrari 2002). Prior to 2006,
a number of schemes for enforcing temporal access control policies using cryptographic
mechanisms appeared in the literature, many of which have been shown to be insecure
(see (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007b) for a summary of this work).
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b), Ateniese, De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2006) and
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2007b) described the first key assignment schemes for temporal
access control with provable security properties. This work focused on two particular aspects:
• the development of schemes that provided key indistinguishability, and
• the reduction of the storage required for public information and the number of operations
required for key derivation.
One shortcoming of their work is that the methods used to tackle the second of these issues do
not consider the actual requirements of the underlying access control policy. Instead, generic
techniques to reduce the diameter of a directed graph are applied. This has two consequences:
optimizations that are tailored to the particular characteristics of the problem are not considered
and only the asymptotic behavior of the constructions is provided. Given that the number of time
intervals m is likely to be rather small in many practical applications, it is not clear that this
kind of approach is the most appropriate. Moreover, the absence of explicit bounds means that
for small m it is not at all obvious which scheme is optimal. In short, existing schemes may be
efficient (for large values of m) but it is questionable whether they are practical.
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007a) have also studied the enforcement of “geo-spatial” ac-
cess control policies. In this context, users are authorized to access data that belongs to particular
locations in a rectangular grid. Atallah et al. apply rather similar techniques (as those used for
temporal access control policies) to construct asymptotic bounds on the amount of space and the
number of derivation steps required.
In this paper, we consider optimizations for both temporal and geo-spatial access control
policies that arise from a rather straightforward observation about the particular problem at
hand. This enables us to present concrete schemes with precise bounds on the amount of storage
and the number of derivation steps required.
The space and time complexity of cryptographic enforcement schemes can be measured
in “edges” and “hops” respectively (Crampton, Martin, and Wild 2006). For the enforcement
of a temporal access control policy with m time points, for example, we require m(m − 1)
edges and ⌈log2m⌉ hops1, whereas Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b) require O
(
m2
)
edges
and O (log∗m) hops and De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008) require O (m2 logm) edges and
O (log∗m) hops.2 However, substantial multiplicative constants and lower-order terms may be
hidden by the O notation when it comes to the number of edges and the number of hops required
for key derivation.3
For values of m that are likely to be used in practice, these terms will be
of considerable importance. The actual number of hops required by the scheme of
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b), for example, is 2 log∗m + 4, which, for many values of
m of practical interest, will be greater than ⌈logm⌉. Moreover, the edge sets that are used in ex-
isting efficient constructions require bespoke algorithms for key derivation and modifications to the
basic operation of a key assignment scheme (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007a). In contrast,
key derivation for our constructions remains very simple.
1Henceforth, all logarithms are base 2, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
2The function log∗ : N→ N is the iterated log function, where log∗ m = 0 if m 6 1 and log∗ m = 1 + log∗(logm)
for m > 1. The iterated log function grows very slowly: log∗ m 6 4 for all m 6 216 and log∗ m 6 5 for all
m 6 265536 , for example.
3The schemes in the literature do not consider the multiplicative constants or lower-order terms. It is, perhaps,
an indication of the complexity of the constructions in the literature that we have not, despite considerable effort,
been able to determine the multiplicative constants in the expressions given for the number of edges.
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Finally, we demonstrate that temporal and geo-spatial access control policies (at least as they
are understood in the context of key assignment schemes) are special cases of a more general type
of policy, which we call an interval-based access control policy. Such policies are parameterized by
an integer k, where temporal and geo-spatial policies correspond to the cases k = 1 and k = 2,
respectively. Perhaps the most important contribution of this paper is to describe how to construct
a set of edges for an arbitrary value of k and provide tight bounds on the number of edges and
key derivation hops required.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
• to generalize the problem of enforcement of temporal and geo-spatial access control policies
to the enforcement of interval-based access control policies;
• to provide tight bounds on the complexity of enforcing temporal, geo-spatial and interval-
based access control policies using key assignment schemes;
• to provide simple, concrete constructions for such schemes.
In the next section, we describe some relevant background material, define what we mean by
an interval-based access control policy, and introduce the problem of enforcing an interval-based
access control policy using cryptographic mechanisms. In Section 3, we consider temporal access
control policies. The main contribution of this section is to state and prove a rather general result
and explore some special cases of this result. In this section we also consider constructions in
which the user may have more than one key. In Section 4, we consider the related problem of
cryptographic enforcement of geo-spatial access control policies. We describe relevant related work
in both Section 3 and 4. In Section 5, we derive results for general interval-based access control
policies. We conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions and some suggestions for
future work.
2 Key Assignment Schemes
Given a partially ordered set of security labels (L,6), an information flow policy requires that
each user u and protected object o be assigned a security label and that information flows between
objects and users are consistent with the ordering6: specifically, u is authorized to read o provided
the security label of u is greater than or equal to that of o (Bell and LaPadula 1976). More
formally, let λ : U ∪O → L be a labeling function that associates each entity with a security label.
Then u is authorized to access o if and only if λ(u) > λ(o).
A key assignment scheme may be used to enforce an information flow policy. In such a scheme,
it is assumed that every node in L is associated with a symmetric cryptographic key. For a given
node x ∈ L, all objects associated with x are encrypted with the appropriate key, and all users
associated with x are given, or can derive, the key for node x and for each node less than or equal
to x.
More formally, a key assignment scheme comprises a set of keys {κ(x) : x ∈ L} and a set of
public information. Each object with security label x is encrypted with κ(x). A user u with the
key κ(λ(u)) must be able to derive κ(y) for any y 6 λ(u), using κ(λ(u)) and public information.
Hence, a user can decrypt any object with security label λ(y), where y 6 λ(u). The first such
scheme was described by Akl and Taylor (1983). The parameters that characterize the behavior
of a key assignment scheme are:
• the number of keys that a user requires;
• the amount of public information that is required;4
• the amount of time taken to derive a key (equivalently, the number of operations required
to perform key derivation).
4The public information always includes a data structure encoding (L,6).
3
We could, trivially, give a user the key associated with each label for which she is authorized,
but this type of approach is rarely considered appropriate. Most of the literature on key assignment
schemes assumes that each user has a single secret value and the keys for which she is authorized
are derived from this secret value. In general, the more public information employed by the scheme,
the smaller the number of key derivation steps required in the worst case.
2.1 Correctness and security
A key assignment scheme that enforces an information flow policy for (L,6) must be correct and
it must be secure. Informally, we say a key assignment scheme is
• correct if each user can derive the keys for which she is authorized;
• secure if no set of users can derive a key for which none of them is authorized.
Recently, the notions of key recovery and key indistinguishability have been
introduced to capture in more formal terms what it means for a key as-
signment scheme to be secure (Atallah, Blanton, Fazio, and Frikken 2009;
Ateniese, De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci 2006). Informally, to obtain a scheme with the
key recovery property, each node x ∈ V is associated with a secret value κ(x), and, for each
edge (x, y) ∈ E, we publish Encκ(x)(κ(y)), where Encκ(M) denotes the encryption of message
M using key κ. Then any user in possession of κ(x) can derive κ(y) in one step, and for any z
on a path from x containing e edges, κ(z) can be (iteratively) derived in e steps. Such a scheme
can be extended to one with the property of key indistinguishability by associating a secret value
σ(x) with each node x, making κ(x) a function of σ(x) and using σ(x) to derive σ(y).
For the purposes of this paper, it is sufficient to note that given a directed,
acyclic graph G = (V,E), there exists a key assignment scheme that has the prop-
erty of key indistinguishability, the amount of storage required is proportional to |E|
(the cardinality of E), and the number of derivation steps required is equal to
the diameter of G (the length of the longest path in G). The interested reader
is referred to the literature for further details (Atallah, Blanton, Fazio, and Frikken 2009;
Ateniese, De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci 2006).
2.2 Derivation-storage trade-offs
A partially ordered set (L,6) can be represented by a directed, acyclic graph (V,E), where V = L.
There are two obvious choices for the edge set E: one is the full partial order relation 6; the second
is to omit all transitive and reflexive edges from 6 to obtain the covering relation, denoted ⋖.
The graph (L,⋖) is called the Hasse diagram of L, and is the standard representation of L as a
directed graph (?).
It can be seen that a key assignment scheme for a directed graph can be used specifically to
enforce an information flow policy. We may use the graph (L,6), in which case key derivation
can always be performed in one step. In contrast, key derivation may require a number of steps
when we use the graph (L,⋖). The trade-off here is that the second graph contains fewer edges
and hence the number of items of public information that are required to support key derivation
is smaller. The study of these kinds of trade-offs will be the focus of this paper.
2.3 Interval-based access control policies
Let O be a set of protected objects, let U be a set of users, and let A1, . . . , Ak be finite, totally
ordered sets of cardinality n1, . . . , nk, respectively. We write A to denote
∏k
i=1Ai = A1×· · ·×Ak.
We say [xi, yi] ⊆ Ai, where 1 6 xi 6 yi 6 ni, is an interval in Ai. We say
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] =
[x1, y1]× · · · × [xk, yk] ⊆ A is a hyperrectangle. We write HRec(A) to denote the set of hyperrect-
angles in A.
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We assume that each object o ∈ O is associated with a unique attribute tuple (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A,
and each user u ∈ U is authorized for some hyperrectangle ∏ki=1[xi, yi] ∈ HRec(A). Then we
say that a user u associated with
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] is authorized to read an object o associated with
tuple (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A if and only if ai ∈ [xi, yi] for all i. Such a policy may be enforced using
cryptographic methods:
• each attribute tuple a = (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A is associated with a cryptographic key, which we
denote by κ(a);
• all objects o that are associated with a are encrypted with κ(a);
• u should be able to derive κ(a) whenever ai ∈ [xi, yi] for all i.
The problem that we consider in the remainder of this paper is the construction of a set of
edges E for the set of nodes HRec(A) such that:
• for all ∏ki=1[xi, yi] and all (a1, . . . , ak), there exists a path from ∏ki=1[xi, yi] to (a1, . . . , ak)
if and only if ai ∈ [xi, yi].
• |E| is small;
• the diameter of the graph (HRec(A), E) is small.
The first criterion requires that the graph implements the desired access control policy. We say
a set of edges E is policy-enforcing, or simply enforcing, if it satisfies this criterion. The second
means that we wish to keep the public storage requirements small, while the final criterion requires
that the complexity of worst-case key derivation time be low.
In the remainder of this section we review two special cases of interval-based access control
that have been widely studied in the literature. To simplify our exposition and comparison with
related work, we will consider these special cases in detail in Sections 3 and 4, before studying the
general case in Section 5.
2.3.1 Temporal access control
When k = 1, we have A = A1. It is customary to interpret A1 as a finite set of n consecutive
time points (see (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007b; De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci 2008), for
example). Each object is associated with a unique time point, and each user is associated with a
set of consecutive time points (an interval). Without loss of generality, we assume that the time
points are in one-to-one correspondence with the integers 1, . . . , n. We write [x, y] to denote the
set {t : x 6 t 6 y}. Then each object is associated with some integer x ∈ [1, n] and each user is
associated with some interval [x, y] ⊆ [1, n]. A user associated with interval [x, y] should be able
to derive κ(t) for all t ∈ [x, y].
Henceforth, we write Tn to denote the set of intervals in [1, n]: that is,
Tn
def
= {[x, y] : 1 6 x 6 y 6 n} .
We denote the set of all intervals by Tn because the partially ordered set (Tn,⊆) has a natural
representation as a triangular grid, as illustrated in Figure 1. We may refer to Tn as an n-triangle.
A node of the form [x, x] ∈ Tn is equivalent to a point x ∈ [1, n] and will be called a leaf node.
The set of leaf nodes corresponds to the totally ordered set of time points 1, . . . , n.
2.3.2 Geo-spatial access control
When k = 2, we have A = A1 × A2, which represents a finite rectangular grid of
points. In this case each object is associated with a unique point in the grid, and each
user is associated with a set of points that correspond to a sub-rectangle of the rectangu-
lar grid (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007a). Without loss of generality, we assume A1 =
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[1,1] [2,2] [3,3] [4,4]
[2,3][1,2] [3,4]
[2,4][1,3]
[1,4]
Figure 1: The Hasse diagram of (T4,⊆)
{1, . . . ,m} and A2 = {1, . . . , n}. Then each object is associated with some point (x, y) and
each user is associated with some rectangle [x1, y1]× [x2, y2] = {(t1, t2) : t1 ∈ [x1, y1], t2 ∈ [x2, y2]}.
We write Tm,n (as an abbreviation of the more accurate Tm×Tn) to denote the set of rectangles
defined by a rectangular m× n grid of points: that is
Tm,n
def
= {[x1, y1]× [x2, y2] : 1 6 x1 6 y1 6 m, 1 6 x2 6 y2 6 n} .
Nodes of the form [x, x]× [y, y] – which may also be interpreted as the point (x, y) – will be called
leaf nodes. The set of leaf nodes corresponds to the set of points in the rectangular m× n grid.
It is rather difficult to represent Tm,n in two dimensions for all but the smallest values of m
and n. Two different visualizations of T2,2 are shown in Figure 2: the first simply illustrates it as a
partially ordered set of subsets ordered by subset inclusion in which rectangles are represented by
filled circles; the second illustrates it by building the rectangles on top of a 2×2 grid (in a manner
analogous to the representation of Tm used in Figure 1). In the second figure, nodes of the same
color have the same area (as rectangles): all rectangles of area 2 are filled in gray, whereas all
rectangles of area 1 are filled white. Although the first visualization is perhaps easier to interpret,
it is the second visualization that we will have in mind when developing our constructions in
Section 4.
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[1,2] [2,2]
[2,2] [2,2]
[2,2] [1,1][1,1] [1,1]
[1,1] [2,2]
[1,2] [1,2]
[2,2] [1,2][1,1] [1,2]
[1,2] [1,1]
(b)
Figure 2: Two representations of T2 × T2
3 Temporal Access Control
In this section we first describe two rather simple schemes that will be used as “building blocks”
for more complex schemes. Then, in Section 3.1, we describe a general construction in which users
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have a single key, and derive a number of concrete constructions as special cases. In particular,
we describe a construction for Tm in which the resulting graph has O
(
m2 log logm
)
edges and
diameter log logm. In Section 3.2 we describe a construction in which users may have two keys.
Before proceeding any further, we note the existence of a lower bound on the cardinality of
an enforcing set of edges and the existence of an enforcing set of edges that yields a graph of
diameter 1.
Proposition 1 Let E be an enforcing set of edges for Tm. Then |E| > m(m− 1).
Proof Suppose that E is an enforcing set of edges such that |E| < m(m− 1). Then at least one
non-leaf node [x, y], where y > x, has out-degree less than 2. This implies one of two things:
• either there exists z ∈ [x, y] such that [z, z] is not reachable from [x, y];
• or there exists an edge from [x, y] to [x′, y′] such that [x, y] 6= [x′, y′] and all z ∈ [x, y] are
reachable from [x′, y′].
In the first case, the edge set does not satisfy the requirement that [z, z] is reachable from [x, y] if
z ∈ [x, y]. In the second case, there are two possibilities:
• either [x, y] ⊂ [x′, y′], in which case there exists z ∈ [x′, y′] such that z 6∈ [x, y] and z is
reachable from [x, y], contradicting the requirement that z is reachable from [x, y] only if
z ∈ [x, y]; or
• [x, y] 6⊂ [x′, y′], so there exists z ∈ [x, y] such that z 6∈ [x′, y′] and [z, z] is reachable from
[x′, y′], which contradicts the requirement that z should be reachable only if z ∈ [x′, y′].
The result follows. 
Proposition 2 (Crampton (2009)) There exists an enforcing set of edges E such that |E| =
1
6m(m− 1)(m+ 4) and the diameter of (Tm, E) is 1.
Proposition 3 (Crampton (2009)) There exists an enforcing set of edges E such that |E| =
m(m− 1) and the diameter of (Tm, E) is ⌈logm⌉.
To establish the above result, we now describe a construction, which we call binary decom-
position, that generates a set of edges with the stated properties. Binary decomposition is a
generalization of a construction we presented in an earlier paper (Crampton 2009, Scheme 2). Bi-
nary decomposition is optimal, in the sense that any set of enforcing edges must have cardinality
at least m(m − 1) (by Proposition 1). We first introduce some additional notation: we write Dn
to denote an n-diamond, which is formed by joining two copies of Tn along the long diagonal; and
we write Rm,n to denote a rectangular grid of nodes of side lengths m and n.
Construction 1 (Binary decomposition) Let ℓ = ⌊m/2⌋ and r = ⌈m/2⌉. Now Tm comprises:
• a copy of Tℓ, containing the minimal elements [1, 1], . . . , [ℓ, ℓ];
• a copy of Tr, containing the minimal elements [ℓ+ 1, ℓ+ 1], . . . , [m,m];
• a copy of rectangle Rℓ,r, containing the remaining nodes in Tm.
This view of T7 is depicted in Figure 3(a). Notice that every interval represented by a node in Rℓ,r
contains ℓ and ℓ+ 1.
The first step in the construction of E, then, is to include an edge from every node in Rℓ,r to
one node in Tℓ and one node in Tr. In particular, for node [x, y] such that x 6 ℓ < y, we add
edges from [x, y] to [x, ℓ] and from [x, y] to [ℓ+ 1, y].
We now recursively apply this construction to Tℓ and Tr, terminating when ℓ, r 6 1. The
construction of the edge set for T7 is illustrated in Figure 3.
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(a) Decomposing T7 into T3, T4 and R3,4 (b) Adding edges to R3,4
(c) Decomposing T3 and T4 (d) Adding the remaining edges
Figure 3: The binary decomposition of T7
3.1 Single-key constructions
Crampton (2009, §5.2) described a construction that generates an enforcing set of edges E of
cardinality 16m(m − 1)(
√
m + 4) such that the diameter of (Tm, E) is 2. The construction was
based on a factorization of m into two integers. We now prove a more general result, in which
we express m as the product of d integers and construct a set of enforcing edges E such that the
diameter of (Tm, E) is d. The result has a number of interesting corollaries, which we also explore
in this section.
Theorem 4 Let m =
∏d
i=1 ai, where ai is an integer and 2 6 ai 6 ai+1 for all i. Then there
exists an enforcing set of edges E such that
|E| = m
2
6
d∑
i=1
(ai − 1)(ai + 4)
πi
, (1)
where πi =
∏i
j=1 aj, and the diameter of (Tm, E) is d.
The result is proved by induction on d and by partitioning Tm into “supernodes”, which are
copies of smaller triangles and diamonds. Informally, the inductive step works by splitting Tm
into a triangle Ta of supernodes, where m = ab, each non-leaf supernode is a copy of Db and each
leaf supernode is a copy of Tb. The application of the construction to T12, where a = 3 and b = 4,
is illustrated in Figure 4.
Proof of Theorem 4 First consider the case d = 1. By Proposition 2, there exists an edge set
with cardinality 16m(m− 1)(m+ 4) and the diameter of the graph is 1 = d. Note that for d = 1,
we have a1 = m and π1 = m in (1), so the result holds for d = 1.
Now let us assume the result holds for all d < D and consider m =
∏D
i=1 ai. For convenience,
we write b =
∏D
i=2 ai (that is, m = a1b). We first note that every node in Tm can be written in
the form [x+ αb, y + βb], where 1 6 x, y 6 b and 0 6 α 6 β < a1.
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• If α = β, then [x+αb, y+ βb] belongs to a leaf triangle supernode which we denote by T (α)b ,
0 6 α < a1.
• If α < β, then [x + αb, y + βb] belongs to a non-leaf diamond supernode, which we denote
by D
(α,β)
b , 0 6 α < β < a1.
Note also that [x+ αb, y + βb], where α < β, is the (disjoint) union of the intervals
[x+ αb, b+ αb], [1 + (α+ 1)b, b+ (α+ 1)b], . . . , [1 + (β − 1)b, b+ (β − 1)b], [1 + βb, y + βb],
which belong, respectively, to T
(α)
b , T
(α+1)
b , . . . , T
(β−1)
b , T
(β)
b .
Now consider a node [x, y] ∈ D(0,a1−1)b . (In other words, [x, y] belongs to the maximal supern-
ode in Ta1 .) Then for each such [x, y], we define
Cx,y
def
= {[x+ αb, y + βb] : 0 6 α < β < a1} .
Then each diamond supernode contains exactly one element of Cx,y and the elements of Cx,y
(ordered by subset inclusion) form a copy of Ta1−1. Since [x+ αb, y+ βb] is the union of intervals
in T
(α)
b , . . . , T
(β)
b , we can connect the nodes in Cx,y directly to the appropriate leaf nodes using a
1-hop construction for Ta1 , which requires
1
6a1(a1 − 1)(a1 + 4) edges. Moreover, Cx,y = Cx′,y′ if
and only if x = x′ and y = y′. Hence, there are b2 = m2/a21 different sets Cx,y (since there are b
choices for each of x and y). Hence, we create a total of m
2
6a1
(a1 − 1)(a1 + 4) edges, which enable
us to jump directly from any node in a diamond supernode to some node in a leaf supernode. We
denote this set of edges by Eouter.
By the inductive hypothesis, there exists an enforcing set of edges Einner for T
(α)
b , 0 6 α < a1.
Moreover, since m/a1 = b =
∏D
i=2 ai and T
(α)
b is a copy of Tm/a1 , we have by the inductive
hypothesis
|Einner| = m
2
6a21
D∑
i=2
(ai − 1)(ai + 4)
a2 . . . ai
.
In total, we require |Eouter|+ a1 |Einner| edges (since there are a1 copies of Tb). Hence the number
of edges is given by
m2
6a1
(a1 − 1)(a1 + 4) + m
2
6a1
D∑
i=2
(ai − 1)(ai + 4)
a2 . . . ai
=
m2
6
D∑
i=1
(ai − 1)(ai + 4)
a1 . . . ai
,
as required.
Moreover, it is clear that the resulting set of edges E is enforcing if Einner is enforcing (which
it is, by the inductive hypothesis). Finally, the diameter of (T
(α)
b , Einner) is D− 1 by the inductive
hypothesis. Hence, the diameter of (Tm, E) is 1 + (D − 1) = D, as required. 
Example 5 The partial construction of a two-hop scheme for T12 is illustrated in Figure 4. We
divide T12 into copies of D4 and T4, yielding a copy of T3 in which the non-leaf supernodes are
diamonds and leaf supernodes are triangles (as depicted in Figure 4(a)).
A one-hop construction for T3 requires seven edges, and must be duplicated for every node
in the root supernode (and there are 42 = 16 such nodes). Hence we require 7 · 16 = 112 edges
to connect nodes in non-leaf supernodes to nodes in leaf supernodes. (A subset of these edges is
depicted in Figure 4(b).) Having done this, we can now get from any node that is contained in a
copy of D4 to a node in T4 in one hop.
It remains, therefore, to construct an edge set for each T4 supernode such that we can get from
any non-leaf node to a leaf node in one hop. We require 16 edges for each of the three copies of
T4 (a total of 48 edges). The construction therefore generates a total of 160 edges.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: Creating a 2-hop scheme for T12 using 1-hop schemes for T3 and T4
In the statement of Theorem 4, note that ai > 2, so
m =
d∏
i=1
ai > 2
d and d 6 logm.
Note also that the ith term in the summation
(ai − 1)(ai + 4)
πi
=
1
πi−1
(
ai + 3− 4
ai
)
is minimized when ai = 2. Finally, note that the difference between successive terms in the
summation is given by
(ai+1 − 1)(ai+1 + 4)
ai+1
− (ai − 1)(ai + 4),
which is approximately equal to zero when ai+1 ≈ a2i . These observations lead to two corollaries of
Theorem 4. The first corollary provides a concise characterization of the number of edges required
for a d-hop solution when m = ad for some integer a (which itself includes binary decomposition
as a special case). The second of these results provides an explicit bound for the number of edges
required in a scheme with log logm steps.
Corollary 6 If m = ad, then there exists an enforcing edge set E such that |E| = 16m(m−1)(a+4)
and the diameter of (Tm, E) is d = logam. In particular, if m = 2
d, then there exists an edge set
of cardinality m(m− 1) and a graph of diameter ⌈logm⌉.
Proof By Theorem 4, we have
|E| = m
2
6
(a− 1)(a+ 4)
d∑
i=1
1
ai
=
m2
6
(a− 1)(a+ 4)
(
1
a− 1
)(
1− 1
ad
)
=
m2
6
(a+ 4)
(
m− 1
m
)
=
1
6
m(m− 1)(a+ 4).
And for a = 2, we have |E| = m(m− 1). 
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Corollary 7 Let m = 22
d
for some integer d > 2. Then there exists an enforcing edge set E such
that
|E| < m2
(
1 +
1
6
log logm
)
and the diameter of (Tm, E) is log logm.
Proof We write m = 2222
1
22
2
22
3
. . . 22
d−1
and apply Theorem 4, thereby obtaining a d-hop
scheme. In particular, we have a1 = 2
21 , ai = 2
2i−1 , i > 2, and πi = 2
2i , i > 1. Hence,
|E| = m
2
6
(
3 · 8
4
+
d∑
i=2
(22
i−1 − 1)(22i−1 + 4)
22i
)
=
m2
6
(
6 +
d∑
i=2
(
1 +
3
22i−1
− 4
22i
))
<
m2
6
(
6 + (d− 1) + 3
d−1∑
i=1
1
22i
)
<
m2
6
(
6 + (d− 1) + 3
∞∑
i=1
1
4i
)
=
m2
6
(6 + d)
= m2
(
1 +
1
6
log logm
)
as required. 
Remark 8 It is worth noting that log logm 6 6 for all m 6 22
6
= 264. In other words, for all
practical values of m, there exists an enforcing set of edges whose cardinality is bounded by 2m2
and for which the number of derivation hops is bounded by log logm.
3.2 Multi-key constructions
In this section, we consider the trade-off that is possible when we assume that users may have
two secret keys (rather than one). In Appendix B, we consider the additional trade-offs that are
possible when the user may have more than two keys. The basic idea is to define a set of special
nodes T ′m ⊆ Tm and a graph (T ′m, E) such that:
• [z, z] ∈ T ′m for all z;
• any interval [x, y] ∈ Tm is the union of no more than two intervals in T ′m; and
• for every [x, y] ∈ T ′m and every z ∈ [x, y], there exists a path in the graph (T ′m, E) from [x, y]
to [z, z].
Then if a user is assigned to interval [x, y], we know that [x, y] is the union of no more than two
intervals in T ′m and for any z ∈ [x, y] there is a path to [z, z] in (T ′m, E). In other words, providing
the user with the keys for the two appropriate intervals enables the user to derive all keys for
which she is authorized.
We first observe that any interval [x, y] such that x 6 ⌈m/2⌉ and y > ⌈m/2⌉ can be written as
[x, ⌈m/2⌉∪ [⌈m/2⌉+1, y]. Recall that the binary decomposition construction splits Tm in precisely
this sort of way. These observations suggest the following recursive construction. For simplicity,
we assume that m is a power of two.
Construction 2 (2-key binary decomposition) We first apply Construction 1 to Tm to ob-
tain a set of edges E. We then identify the set of special nodes.
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(1) If m = 1, then mark the node as a special node.
(2) If m > 1, then mark every node of the form
(a) [x,m/2], for x < m/2, as a special node;
(b) [m/2 + 1, y], for y > m/2 + 1 as a special node.
(3) Split Tm into Dm/2, T
left
m/2 and T
right
m/2 and recursively apply the node marking to T
left
m/2 and
T rightm/2 .
Then T ′m is defined to be the set of special nodes and we define the edge set to be E
′ = E ∩
{(x, y) : x, y ∈ T ′m}.
In other words, (T ′m, E
′) is the sub-graph of the binary decomposition of Tm induced by the
set of special nodes T ′m. The result of applying 2-key binary decomposition to T16 is shown in
Figure 5, in which the special nodes are represented by filled circles. (The marking of leaf nodes
and identification of edges are conflated in the final part of the figure.)
Then a key assignment scheme in which users may have two keys is implemented by construct-
ing a key assignment scheme for the key derivation graph produced by Construction 2. A user
associated with interval [3, 14], for example, would then be given the keys for intervals [3, 8] and
[9, 14].
Figure 5: Applying Construction 2 to T16
Proposition 9 Let m = 2d for some integer d. Then there exists a set of enforcing edges E such
that |E| < 2m logm, (Tm, E) comprises two disconnected components, and the diameter of each
component is logm/2.
Proof Clearly Construction 2 terminates after logm rounds. Moreover, s(m), the number
of special nodes in Tm, satisfies the recurrence s(m) < m + 2s(m/2), from which we deduce
that s(m) < m logm and, since the out-degree of each special node equals 2, we deduce that
|E| < 2m logm. Clearly, the diameter of (Tm, E) equals logm− 1 = logm/2. 
We also note that we can use a similar method to create a one-hop two-key scheme with O (n2)
edges. In particular, we have the following result.
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Proposition 10 There exists a set of enforcing edges E such that |E| < 12m(m − 1 + logm),
(Tm, E) comprises two disconnected components, and the diameter of each component is 1.
Proof Consider the set of edges E of cardinality 16m(m− 1)(m+ 4) that defines a 1-hop graph
for Tm and then take the subgraph of (Tm, E) induced by the set of special nodes. From the
top-left corner of Figure 5, it is evident that the number of edges in this subgraph e(m) satisfies
the following inequality:
e(2m) < 2tm + 2e(m),
where tm denotes the mth triangle number. Hence, we have
e(2m) <
1
2
m(m+ 1) + 2e(m),
from which we may prove the required result using a straightforward induction. 
3.3 Related work
A number of authors have used ‘binary tree encryption”, which can be used to en-
force temporal access control policies cryptographically (see (Backes, Cachin, and Oprea 2006;
Canetti, Halevi, and Katz 2007), for example). In such schemes, assuming n = 2m for some integer
m, the parent node is [1, n] and the two child nodes of node [x, y] are [x, x+y2 ] and [
x+y
2 +1, y]. Then
any interval [x, y] ∈ Tn is the disjoint union of no more than 2(logn−1) intervals: [2, 15] ∈ T16, for
example, is the union of the intervals [2, 2], [3, 4], [5, 8], [9, 12], [13, 14] and [15, 15]. In other words,
we may enforce a temporal access control policy using binary tree encryption, by supplying each
user with at most 2(logn−1) keys and key derivation time requires no more than logn steps. The
great advantage of such schemes is that the key of a child node can be derived directly from the
key of the parent, since the key derivation graph is a tree. Hence, binary tree encryption schemes
require no public information.
The focus of our work, however, is on schemes – arguably, more practical schemes – in which
users have a single key. Two groups of researchers have studied this form of cryptographic en-
forcement of temporal access control in some detail. In this section, we discuss these two strands
of research and our own work in this area. We then summarize and compare the respective results
to our work.
• Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b) propose a number of schemes that reduce the number
of edges and the maximum number of hops for Tm, using techniques previously developed for
total orders (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2006). Henceforth, we will use the term chain,
rather than total order, and we will write Cn to denote the chain containing n elements.
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b) treat Tm as the direct product of two orthogonal
sets of chains and apply short-cutting techniques for chains. To derive the key for interval
[z, z] ⊆ [x, y] given the key for [x, y], for example, their method requires us to first derive
the key for [z, y] using one chain (comprising intervals of the form [1, y], . . . , [x, y], . . . , [y, y]),
and then to derive the key for [z, z] using an orthogonal chain (comprising intervals of the
form [z,m], . . . , [z, y], . . . , [z, z]).
Any set of enforcing edges E for chain Cm, such that |E| = O (f(m)) and the diameter of
the graph (Cm, E) is O (d(m)), can be used to construct a set of enforcing edges E′ for Tm
such that |E′| is O (mf(m)) and the diameter of (Tm, E′) is O (d(m)). More specifically, if
the diameter of (Cm, E) is d, then the diameter of (Tm, E
′) is 2d, and if |E| = f(m), then
|E′| = 2∑mi=1 f(i).
• De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008) propose a number of schemes that take a quite dif-
ferent approach, using earlier work due to Thorup (1995) and Dushnik and Miller (1941) to
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reduce the diameter of Tm, and to Alon and Schieber (1987) to reduce the number of edges
(by increasing the number of keys).
Thorup (1995) showed that given a rooted, acyclic, planar, directed graph G = (V,E), there
exists a set Es of “shortcut edges” such that |Es| 6 |E| and the diameter of (V,E ∪ Es) is
O (log |V | log∗ |V |).
The second result they use is that given a poset of dimension 2 with Hasse diagram
G = (V,E), there exists a set of shortcut edges Es such that the graph (V,E∪Es) has diam-
eter O (log∗ |V |) and |Es| is O
(
d |V | (3 log |V |)d−1) (De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci 2007a;
Dushnik and Miller 1941).
Alon and Schieber (1987), Yao (1982), and Bodlaender, Tel, and Santoro (1994) have all
studied c-coverings, which are used to represent an interval as the union of no more than
c smaller intervals. De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008) have considered the use of c-
coverings in their work to create multi-key schemes in which each user requires no more
than c keys.
Both strands of research include enforcement schemes in which users may have multiple keys, as
well as schemes in which users have precisely one key. De Santis et al. provide several different
ways of constructing key assignment schemes for Tm, whereas Atallah et al. rely on schemes for
chains to construct their key assignment schemes. The schemes of De Santis et al. provide greater
flexibility in the choice of parameters, allowing, for example, a choice in the number of keys for a
particular scheme. In contrast, the schemes of Atallah et al. use three keys, because of the data
structures that are used to build their schemes. Moreover, the 3-key schemes of Atallah et al.
are rather artificial, in the sense that enabling keys have to be introduced and more information
needs to be stored both at the server side and the client side to enable key derivation to take
place (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007a, §5.3 and 5.4).
We previously introduced a number of schemes (Crampton 2009), including binary decompo-
sition, which we generalize in this paper. The main distinguishing feature of our work is the focus
on improved schemes that are directly relevant to the problem at hand, whereas prior work has
simply applied existing short-cutting techniques, without considering the particular characteristics
of the graph Tm and its application to temporal access control. Specifically, in our previous work
and in this paper we exploit the fact that it is not necessary to be able to derive keys for non-leaf
intervals, in contrast to the work of other researchers.
As a consequence of our more direct approach, we are able to define schemes for which it
possible to compute either exact values or tight upper bounds on storage and derivation costs,
whereas related work only describes asymptotic behavior. For large values ofm, such a description
may be useful, but, for smaller (and arguably more relevant) values of m, our approach is more
informative. Moreover, without knowing the multiplicative constants and lower-order terms hidden
by the O notation, it is difficult to ascertain which scheme in the literature is the best to use for
a particular value of m. The relevant characteristics of comparable schemes in the literature and
those introduced in this paper are summarized in Figure 6.
4 Geo-Spatial Access Control
Atallah et al. have also applied their techniques to a graph in which the nodes correspond to
rectangles of the form I1 × I2, where I1 ∈ Tm and I2 ∈ Tn (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007a).
Each object is associated with a point (x, y) (equivalently, a “unit” rectangle [x, x]× [y, y]), where
x ∈ [1,m] and y ∈ [1, n]. If a user is associated with node I1 × I2 then the user should be able to
derive the key for each point [x, x] × [y, y] ∈ I1 × I2 (where x ∈ I1 and y ∈ I2). The set of points
enclosed by a rectangle is defined by the endpoints of the two intervals.
There are 12m(m + 1) and
1
2n(n + 1) such intervals in Tm and Tn, respectively, so there are
a total of 14mn(m + 1)(n + 1) possible rectangles contained in Tm × Tn (and hence nodes in the
graph). Again, it is important to note that the user is not required to be able to derive keys for
all subsets of I1 × I2, only those subsets of the form [x, x] × [y, y].
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Scheme Public Storage Derivation
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b, §4) O (m2 logm) 4
O (m2) O (log∗m)
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008, §3.1) O (m2) O (logm log∗m)
O (m2 logm) O (log∗m)
O (m2 logm log logm) 3
Crampton (2009, §3.1) m(m− 1) ⌈logm⌉
Crampton (2009, §5) 16m(m− 1)(
√
m+ 4) 2
This paper m2
(
1 + 16 ⌈log logm⌉
) ⌈log logm⌉
(a) Single-key constructions
Scheme Keys Public Storage Derivation
Binary encryption trees 2(logn− 1) 0 logn
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007b, §5) 3 O (m log logm) 5
3 O (m log logm) O (log∗m)
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008, §4) 2 O (m logm) O (m)
3 O (m log logm) O (√m)
4 O (m log∗m) O
(
m
logm
)
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008, §4) 2 O (m2 logm) 1
3 O (m√m log logm) 1
4 O
(
m2
logm
)
1
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci (2008, §4) O (log∗m) O (m) O
(
m
(log∗m)3 logm
)
O (log∗m) O (m(log∗m)3) 1
This paper 2 2m ⌈logm⌉ ⌊logm⌋
3 5m ⌈log logm⌉ logm+ ⌈log logm⌉
4 6m ⌈log∗m⌉ logm+ ⌈log∗m⌉
(b) Multi-key constructions
Figure 6: A comparison of existing work and our contributions
Recall the binary decomposition technique for Tm (Construction 1): for a given interval [x, y]
such that x 6 ⌊m/2⌋ and y > ⌊m/2⌋ + 1, we connected [x, y] to two intervals [x, ⌊m/2⌋] and
[⌊m/2⌋ + 1, y]. We now demonstrate how this technique can be extended to Tm,n. Suppose, for
illustrative purposes, that m = n = 16 and consider the rectangle [3, 11] × [2, 14] (as illustrated
schematically in Figure 7(a)). Then we can decompose this rectangle into four smaller rectangles
in which each interval contains no more than 8 points: namely
[3, 11]× [2, 14] = ([3, 8]× [2, 8]) ∪ ([3, 8]× [9, 14]) ∪ ([9, 11]× [2, 8]) ∪ ([9, 11]× [9, 14])
We can repeat this decomposition for each of these four rectangles, so that each interval contains
no more than 4 points. It is easy to see that the out-degree of each node in the resulting graph
can be no greater than 4 and that the number of decompositions required (and hence the diameter
of the resulting graph) is 4 = log 16. Hence, we can construct an enforcing set of edges E whose
cardinality is bounded by 4 |Tn,n| = n2(n+ 1)2 and for which the diameter of the graph (Tn,n, E)
is ⌈logn⌉. However, we can reduce the number of edges by conducting a more detailed analysis.
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In the next section, we provide a tighter bound on the number of edges required to construct
a graph of diameter logn for Tn,n. We then consider constructions for Tm,n, where m 6= n, and
briefly look at multi-key constructions, before comparing our contributions with existing work.
4.1 Constructions for Tn,n
We first determine the number of edges required by a 1-hop scheme.
Proposition 11 There exists an enforcing set of edges E such that
|E| < 1
36
n2(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)2 =
1
9
(n+ 2)2 |Tn,n|
and the diameter of (Tn,n, E) is 1.
Proof Every node in Tn,n is a rectangle and every point contained in each rectangle should be
reachable in a single hop. The area of each node corresponds to the number of leaf nodes that
are reachable from this node. Hence, the number of edges e(n) required to construct a graph of
diameter 1 for Tn,n is
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aijij, where aij is the number of rectangles of area ij. Now the
number of rectangles of area ij is the number of intervals of length i multiplied by the number of
intervals of length j. Hence, we have
e(n) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(n− i+ 1)(n− j + 1)ij =
(
n∑
i=1
(n− i+ 1)i
)2
=
1
36
n2(n+ 1)2(n+ 2)2.
In fact, e(n) is an overestimate for the number of edges required because we have included n2
rectangles of area 1, which are leaf nodes. The result follows. 
Theorem 12 There exists an enforcing set of edges E such that
|E| = 1
3
n2(n− 1)(2n+ 5) < 8
3
|Tn,n|
and the diameter of the graph (Tn,n, E) is bounded by ⌈logn⌉.
Proof Given n = 2m, for some integer m, we can divide the n× n grid into four m×m grids,
which we label T
(0,0)
m,m , T
(0,1)
m,m , T
(1,0)
m,m , and T
(1,1)
m,m . Then there are three types of rectangles in Tn,n
(illustrated in Figure 7):
1. those in which each vertex is in a different m-grid;
2. those in which one pair of vertices is contained in one m-grid and the other pair of vertices
are in an adjacent m-grid;
3. those in which each vertex is in the same m-grid.
Then we construct an edge set in which:
• each Type 1 rectangle is connected to four child rectangles, one in each m-grid; and
• each Type 2 rectangle is connected to two child rectangles, one in each m-grid that contains
a pair of the rectangle’s vertices.
We then recursively construct an edge set for each copy of Tm,m. Hence, the number of edges
e(n) required by this construction is 4a + 2b + 4e(m), where a represents the number of Type 1
rectangles and b represents the number of Type 2 rectangles.
We now compute a and b. Note that we have m choices for each of the four endpoints of
the intervals that define a Type 1 rectangle (since each vertex lies in a different m-grid). Hence,
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(0,0) (0,1)
(1,0) (1,1)
(a) Type 1 (b) Type 2 (c) Type 3
Figure 7: Examples of rectangle types in a 2m× 2m grid
a = m4. To compute b, we first consider the number of rectangles in a pair of adjacent m-grids:
we have m2 choices for the endpoints of the “long” side of a Type 2 rectangle (that spans two
m-grids), and 12m(m+1) choices for the endpoints of the “short” side (where the endpoints belong
to the same m-grid). Clearly, there are four different choices of adjacent m-grids, each containing
the same number of Type 2 rectangles. Hence, b = 2m3(m+1). Therefore, we deduce the following
recurrence relation for e(n).
e(n) = 4m4 + 4m3(m+ 1) + 4e(m)
= 4m3(2m+ 1) + 4e(m)
=
1
2
n3(n+ 1) + 4e
(n
2
)
Using this recurrence relation, we prove by induction that e(n) = 13n
2(n− 1)(2n+ 5).
Consider n = 2: it is easy to see by inspection that we require 4 + 8 = 12 edges, so the result
holds for n = 2 (since, using the formula, e(2) = 13 · 4 · 1 · 9 = 12). Now assume that the result
holds for all n < N . Then
e(N) =
1
2
N3(N + 1) + 4e
(
N
2
)
(by the recurrence relation)
=
1
2
N3(N + 1) +
4
3
N2
4
(
N
2
− 1
)
(N + 5) (by the inductive hypothesis)
=
1
6
N2
(
3N2 + 3N +N2 + 3N − 10)
=
1
3
N2(N − 1)(2N + 5)
as required. Moreover,
e(n) =
1
3
n2(n− 1)(2n+ 5) = 1
3
n2(2n2 + 3n− 5) < 2
3
n2(n+ 1)2 =
8
3
|Tn,n| .
It is evident that the construction terminates after no more than ⌈logn⌉ iterations and that the
diameter of the resulting graph will be ⌈logn⌉. 
4.2 Constructions for Tm,km
We now consider constructions for Tm,km, where m and k are integers. (These constructions can
be extended to Tm,n, for any integers m 6 n, by writing n = km+ r, where 0 6 r < m.)
We consider an m × km grid to be k copies of an m × m grid, which we may label
T
(1,1)
m,m , . . . , T
(1,k)
m,m . Then all four vertices of a rectangle in Tm,km may belong to the same m-
grid, or one pair of vertices belongs to one m-grid and the other pair to another grid. In other
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m4m
Figure 8: A m× 4m grid and the various types of rectangles that may arise in it
words, the number of possible choices of m-grids for the vertices of a rectangle corresponds to the
number of intervals in [1, k]. This is illustrated schematically for a m×4m grid in Figure 8. These
observations suggest the following approach:
• For each rectangle in Tm,km that is not included in one copy of Tm,m, add edges to the
appropriate rectangles in two or more copies of Tm,m;
• Construct an enforcing set of edges for each copy of Tm,m.
In Section 3 we identified a number of schemes for Tk and we have seen (in Theorem 12) how
to construct an enforcing set of edges E such that the diameter of Tm,m is logm. Putting this
together, we obtain the following result.
Theorem 13 There exist enforcing sets of edges E1 and E2 such that
• |E1| = 112km2
(
(k− 1)(k+4)m(m+1)+ 4(m− 1)(2m+5)) and the diameter of (Tm,km, E1)
is logm+ 1 = log 2m;
• |E2| = 16km2
(
3(k − 1)m(m + 1) + 2(m − 1)(2m + 5)) and the diameter of (Tm,km, E2) is
logm+ log k = log km.
Proof For each rectangle that belongs to two or morem-grids we havem2 choices for the vertices
that belong to different m-grids and 12m(m+1) choices for those that belong to the same m-grid.
Hence, in total we have 12m
3(m + 1) possible choices for such rectangles. Hence, we can build a
set of enforcing edges for the m× km grid, whose cardinality is given by
1
2
m3(m+ 1)e(Tk) + ke(Tm,m), (2)
where e(Tk) is the cardinality of some enforcing set of edges for Tk and e(Tm,m) is the cardinality
of some enforcing set of edges for Tm,m. The number of hops required will be the number of hops
for Tk plus the number of hops required for Tm,m.
Each rectangle in Tm,km has non-empty intersection with T
(1,x)
m,m , . . . , T
(1,y)
m,m for some x and y.
To obtain E1, we add an edge from each rectangle in Tm,km to a single rectangle in each of T
(1,z)
m,m ,
z ∈ [x, y]. In other words, the number of edges required will be the number of edges required for
a 1-hop scheme for Tk multiplied by the number of rectangles in each interval. Hence, using the
1-hop construction in the proof of Theorem 4 and applying (2), we have
|E1| = 1
12
m3(m+ 1)k(k − 1)(k + 4) + 1
3
km2(m− 1)(2m+ 5)
=
1
12
km2
(
(k − 1)(k + 4)m(m+ 1) + 4(m− 1)(2m+ 5))
We require a single hop to get from any rectangle to a rectangle in a copy of Tm,m and we require
logm hops to get from any rectangle in Tm,m to a leaf node. Hence, the diameter of (Tm,km, E1)
is 1 + logm.
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To obtain E2, we construct an enforcing set of edges that enables us to get from each rectangle
in Tm,km to a rectangle in a copy of Tm,m in log k hops. Using Construction 1, we require k(k− 1)
edges for each rectangle. Hence,
|E2| = 1
2
m3(m+ 1)k(k − 1) + 1
3
km2(m− 1)(2m+ 5)
=
1
6
km2
(
3(k − 1)m(m+ 1) + 2(m− 1)(2m+ 5))
In this case, the number of hops required in total is log k + logm. 
Corollary 14 For k > 1, there exists an enforcing set of edges E such that
|E| < 2 |Tm,km|
(
1 +
1
3k
)
6
8
3
|Tm,km|
and the diameter of (Tm,km, E) is log km.
Proof The result for k = 1 follows from Theorem 12. For k > 1, we have (from the proof of
Theorem 13)
E2 =
1
6
km2
(
3(k − 1)m(m+ 1) + 2(m− 1)(2m+ 5))
=
1
6
km2(3km2 + 3km− 3m2 − 3m+ 4m2 + 6m− 10)
=
1
6
km2(3km(m+ 1) +m2 + 3m− 10)
<
1
6
km2(3km(m+ 1) + (m+ 1)(m+ 2))
=
1
6
km2(3km+m+ 2)(m+ 1)
=
1
6
m(m+ 1)km(3km+ 3 +m− 1)
=
1
2
m(m+ 1)km(km+ 1) +
1
6
m(m+ 1)km(m− 1)
and, since |Tm,km| = 14m(m+ 1)km(km+ 1), we have
E2 = 2 |Tm,km|+ 2
3
(
m− 1
km+ 1
)
|Tm,km| < 2 |Tm,km|
(
1 +
1
3k
)
as required. Clearly 1 + 13k monotonically decreases as k increases, so |E2| is a maximum when
k = 1. Hence |E2| < 83 |Tm,km|. 
4.3 Multi-key constructions
In Section 3.2, we showed how we could reduce the number of edges in an enforcing set if we
assumed that a user may be given two keys. Essentially, this assumption allows us to reduce the
number of nodes in the key derivation graph for Tn from approximately
1
2n
2 to n logn. We now
develop an analogous approach for Tn,n.
First, we explain how the set of special rectangles is defined. We divide Tn,n into four copies
of Tm,m, where m = n/2. Then the following rectangles are defined to be special nodes:
• [x,m]× [y, z], where x, y, z ∈ [1,m− 1];
• [x, y]× [z,m], where x, y, z ∈ [1,m− 1];
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• [m+ 1, x]× [y, z], where x ∈ [m+ 2, 2m], y, z ∈ [1,m− 1];
• [x, y]× [z,m], where x, y ∈ [m+ 2, 2m], z ∈ [1,m− 1];
• [x,m]× [y, z], where x ∈ [1,m− 1], y, z ∈ [m+ 2, 2m];
• [x, y]× [m+ 1, z], where x, y ∈ [1,m− 1], z ∈ [m+ 2, 2m];
• [m+ 1, x]× [y, z], where x ∈ [m+ 2, 2m], y, z ∈ [m+ 2, 2m];
• [x, y]× [m+ 1, z], where x, y ∈ [m+ 2, 2m], z ∈ [m+ 2, 2m].
In other words, special nodes in Tn, where n = 2m > 2, are non-leaf rectangles in which at least
one endpoint is m or m + 1. Having identified the special nodes in Tn,n, we then recursively
identify the special nodes in each copy of Tm,m. Figure 9 illustrates how a Type 1 rectangle can
be split into four special rectangles.
1 m m+1 2m 1 m m+1 2m
Figure 9: Representing a Type 1 rectangle in T2m,2m as the union of four special rectangles
Theorem 15 Let n = 2m for some integer m. Then there exists an enforcing set of edges E for
Tn,n such that |E| 6 4n2(n− 1), the graph (Tn,n, E) comprises four disconnected components, and
the diameter of (Tn,n, E) is ⌊logn⌋.
Proof We first count the number of special rectangles. Without loss of generality, we consider
the copy of Tm,m in which all special rectangles contain an interval of the form [x,m] for some
x ∈ [1,m − 1] (corresponding to the bottom left quadrant in Figure 9).5 Then the number of
special nodes is the total number of rectangles in Tm,m minus the number of rectangles that are
not special nodes. Since a non-special rectangle cannot contain an interval in which the upper
endpoint is equal to m, the number of non-special rectangles is 14 (m− 1)2m2. Hence, the number
of special rectangles is given by
1
4
m2(m+ 1)2 − 1
4
m2(m− 1)2 = m3.
By symmetry, Tn,n contains 4m
3 = 12n
3 special rectangles in which at least one endpoint is m or
m+ 1.
The recursive construction implies that s(n), the total number of rectangles that will be marked
as special, satisfies the recurrence s(n) 6 n3/2 + 4s(n/2), from which we deduce that s(n) 6
n2(n − 1). Since each special rectangle has out-degree no greater than 4, we conclude that there
exists an enforcing set of edges of cardinality no greater than 4n2(n− 1). 
5By symmetry, each copy of Tm,m contains the same number of special rectangles.
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4.4 Related work
Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007a, §4) propose a scheme for geo-spatial access control in which
each user has a single key, the number of key derivation steps is O (1) and the number of edges is
O (n4(log n2)3 log∗ n). They then propose more complex schemes in which the user has O (1) keys.
These schemes require complex, auxiliary data structures and key derivation algorithms. The num-
ber of edges required by their best scheme for Tm,n, where m > n, is O
(
mn(log logm)2 log∗m
)
.
It is difficult to compare the performance of our schemes with those of Atallah et al. because
most of their schemes use O (1) keys. The only scheme that uses a single key has constant time
key derivation (requiring no more than 9 hops) and requires O (m2n2(logmn)3 log∗mn) edges.
The scheme is rather complicated and involves reducing the 4-dimensional poset (Tm,n,⊆) to a set
of 1-dimensional posets (that is, chains) and then constructing edge sets for each of these chains
and edge sets to connect the chains.
Recently, Yuan and Atallah (2009) used O (mn) copies of a scheme for a chain to create a
scheme in which the user requiresO (1) keys andO (mn log∗m) edges, and the number of derivation
steps is O (1). However, the paper is rather vague on the details of the scheme and how it compares
to the closely related work of Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken (2007a) described in the preceding
paragraphs, so it is difficult to provide a direct comparison with our work.
By Corollary 14, the number of edges required by our scheme is less than 23mn(m+ 1)(n+ 1)
and key derivation takes no more than logmn steps. Moreover, our construction is analogous
to our binary decomposition for temporal access control: we will see in the next section that
our construction generalizes readily to higher dimensions; in contrast, the extension of existing
schemes to higher dimensions is non-trivial.
5 Interval-Based Access Control
In this section, we generalize temporal and geo-spatial access control to interval-based access
control. Consider
T kn
def
= Tn × · · · × Tn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
.
We call an element [x1, y1] × · · · × [xk, yk] ∈ T kn a (k-dimensional) hyperrectangle and write it∏k
i=1[xi, yi]. A 1-dimensional hyperrectangle is an interval (as in Section 3) and a 2-dimensional
hyperrectangle is simply a rectangle (as in Section 4). In interval-based access control, protected
objects are associated with a “trivial” hyperrectangle
∏k
i=1[xi, xi] (which is simply a point in k-
dimensional space) and users are associated with a hyperrectangle
∏k
i=1[xi, yi]. A user associated
with hyperrectangle
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] is authorized for an object associated with
∏k
i=1[zi, zi] if and only
if zi ∈ [xi, yi] for all i.
Theorem 16 There exists a set of enforcing edges E for T kn such that
|E| = n
k
2k
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3i − 1)(ni − 1)
2i − 1
and the diameter of (T kn , E) is logn.
Note that substituting k = 1 and k = 2 into the above formula, we obtain |E| = n(n− 1) and
|E| = 13n2(n − 1)(2n + 5), confirming the results of Sections 3 and 4. Before proving the above
theorem, we state a useful result, which can be proved by induction.
Proposition 17 Let k > 1, i > 0 and a0, . . . , at be integers and let n = 2
m for some non-zero
positive integer m. If
f(n)− 2kf
(n
2
)
=
(n
2
)k t∑
i=0
ai
(n
2
)i
,
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for all n, and f(1) = 0, then
f(n) =
(n
2
)k(
a0 logn+
t∑
i=1
ai
ni − 1
2i − 1
)
Proof of Theorem 16 Let n = 2m. Then we may split T kn into 2
k copies of T km. A hyperrectangle
has non-empty intersection with one or more of the 2k copies of T km. Our proof proceeds by
counting the number of copies of T km with which a hyperrectangle intersects and how that, in turn,
determines the number of edges required for that hyperrectangle.
We first recall the methods of Sections 3 and 4. For k = 1 (Section 3) we split Tn into two
copies of Tm and every interval in Tn has non-empty intersection with either one or two copies of
Tm. For k = 1, the two copies of Tm may be identified with the 1-bit string 0 and 1. The endpoints
of [x, y] ∈ Tn are simply x and y. Then either both endpoints (that is, x and y) belong to the
same copy of Tm or they are in different copies. In the first case, there are
1
2m(m + 1) choices
for the endpoints, since we require that x 6 y; in the second case, there are m2 choices, since we
choose any value from the copy of Tm corresponding to 0 for the lower endpoint and any value
from the copy of Tm corresponding to 1 for the upper endpoint. And when k = 2 (Section 4), T
2
n
may be split into four copies of Tm labeled (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) and (1, 1). An element of T
2
n is a
rectangle, which “straddles” one, two or four copies of Tm depending on which of the four copies
of Tm contain the lower left and upper right corners of the rectangle (as we saw in the proof of
Theorem 12).
More generally, each copy of Tm in T
k
n can be identified with a k-bit string. Then each element
of T kn has two k-dimensional endpoints, which uniquely identify the two copies of Tm to which those
endpoints belong. More generally, each hyperrectangle in T kn is enclosed by some hyperrectangle
comprising 2d copies of Tm for some integer d 6 k, where d is determined by the endpoints. We
wish to determine d for a given element of T kn .
We denote the “left” or “lower” endpoint of an element of T kn by l = (l1, . . . , lk) ∈ {0, 1}k and
the “right” or “upper” endpoint by r = (r1, . . . , rk) ∈ {0, 1}k. Then we have li 6 ri, for all i.
Now the Hamming distance of l and r determines the “volume” of the enclosing hyperrectangle,
measured as multiples of T km. Specifically, if the Hamming distance between the two endpoint
strings is d (that is, li = 0 and ri = 1 for d values of i) then the enclosing hyperrectangle contains
2d copies of Tm.
The number of pairs of strings with Hamming distance d is determined by the choice of co-
ordinates at which li 6= ri and the values chosen for the remaining positions. Clearly there are(
k
d
)
choices of d co-ordinate positions and, having fixed those positions, there are 2k−d choices for
the values of the remaining k − d positions. Hence, the number of different endpoints that are
enclosed in a hyperrectangle of 2d copies of 2m is 2k−d
(
k
d
)
.
Now an arbitrary element in
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] ∈ T kn for which the Hamming distance of the endpoints
is d “straddles” 2d copies of Tm, and is the union of 2
d elements of T km. (When k = 1, for example,
every interval in Tn is the union of 1 or 2 intervals contained in T
(0)
m and T
(1)
m .) Therefore, 2d
edges will be required to connect
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] to the appropriate child hyperrectangles that are
contained in copies of Tm.
For an arbitrary element
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] ∈ T kn with endpoints l, r ∈ {0, 1}k, the value of li ⊕ ri
determines how many choices there are for xi and yi. Specifically, if li = ri, then xi and yi belong
to the same m-cube and there are 12m(m + 1) choices for the pair (xi, yi) since we must ensure
that yi > xi. However, if li < ri, then xi and yi belong to different m-cubes and there are m
2
choices for (xi, yi), since yi is necessarily greater than xi and therefore we have a free choice of xi
and yi from m values. Therefore, if the Hamming distance of l and r is d, then the total number
of choices for
∏k
i=1[xi, yi] is
(m2)d
(
1
2
m(m+ 1)
)k−d
=
1
2k−d
mk+d(m+ 1)k−d
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We conclude that the set of edges required to connect all hyperrectangles with Hamming distance
d to the appropriate child hyperrectangles has cardinality a(d)b(d)c(d), where
• a(d) = 2d is the number of children of a hyperrectangle with Hamming distance d,
• b(d) = 2k−d(kd) is the number of possible choices of enclosing hyperrectangles for a hyper-
rectangle with Hamming distance d, and
• c(d) = 12k−dmk+d(m+1)k−d is the number of choices of endpoints for each of the k intervals
comprising a hyperrectangle with Hamming distance d.
Clearly, the Hamming distance d takes values between 0 and k, so the total number of edges
required, denoted e(n, k), satisfies the recurrence relation:
e(n, k) = 2ke(m, k) +
k∑
d=0
2d2k−d
(
k
d
)
1
2k−d
mk+d(m+ 1)k−d
= 2ke(m, k) +mk
k∑
d=0
(
k
d
)
(2m)d(m+ 1)k−d
and, applying the binomial theorem, we obtain
e(n, k) = 2ke(m, k) +mk(2m+m+ 1)k = 2ke(m, k) +mk(3m+ 1)k.
Now, this total includes an edge for each hyperrectangle that is contained in a singlem-cube (when
the Hamming distance is 0). For a recursive construction, we can omit these edges (of which there
are 2k 1
2k
mk(m + 1)k = mk(m + 1)k). Hence, subtracting the edges for hyperrectangles with
Hamming distance 0, we obtain
e(n, k) = 2ke(m, k) +mk(3m+ 1)k −mk(m+ 1)k
= 2ke(m, k) +mk
(
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3m)i −
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
mi
)
= 2ke(m, k) +mk
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3i − 1)mi.
Replacing m by n/2, we obtain
e(n, k) = 2ke
(n
2
, k
)
+
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3i − 1)
(n
2
)i+k
.
Moreover, e(1, k) = 0 for all k. Hence, we may apply Proposition 17, thereby obtaining
e(n, k) =
nk
2k
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3i − 1)(ni − 1)
2i − 1 (3)
as required.
Clearly the number of derivation steps d(n) obeys the recurrence relation d(n) = 1 + d(n/2),
from which it immediately follows that d(n) = logn. 
Corollary 18 There exists a set of enforcing edges E such that
(3k − 1)nk(nk − 1)
2k(2k − 1) < |E| <
(3k − 1)nk(nk + 1)
2k(2k − 1)
and the diameter of (T kn , E) is logn.
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Proof The term in the left-hand side of the inequality is simply the last term in the summation
in (3). Now note that
3i − 1
2i − 1 <
3i+1 − 1
2i+1 − 1
for all i > 1. Hence, we have
e(n, k) =
nk
2k
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(3i − 1)(ni − 1)
2i − 1 <
nk(3k − 1)
2k(2k − 1)
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
(ni − 1)
<
nk(3k − 1)
2k(2k − 1)
k∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
ni <
nk(3k − 1)
2k(2k − 1) (n+ 1)
k,
as required. 
Remark 19 Since
∣∣T kn ∣∣ = 12k nk(n+ 1)k, the above result implies that |E| is Θ(( 32)k ∣∣T kn ∣∣).
To conclude this section, we state and prove a result that provides an upper bound on the
number of edges required in an enforcing set when we assume that a user may have up to 2k
keys. We do not describe the recursive procedure that is used to label special nodes, as it is a
straightforward generalization of the techniques described in Sections 3.2 and 4.3.
Theorem 20 There exists a set of enforcing edges E such that
|E| 6 2knk(nk−1 + logn− 1),
the graph of (T kn , E) comprises 2
k disconnected components and the diameter of the graph is logn.
Proof Let n = 2m for some integer m. Then we can divide the hypercube T kn into 2
k copies of
the hypercube T km. As before, without loss of generality, we consider the hypercube T
k
m in which
all intervals are of the form [xi, yi] with [xi, yi] ∈ [1,m]. The special hyperrectangles in this copy
of T km have the form
∏k
i=1[xi, yi], where xi = m or yi = m for some i. Since we can choose any one
of k intervals in which to fix an endpoint, the total number of special rectangles in a particular
copy of T km is no greater than
km
(
1
2
m(m+ 1)
)k−1
=
1
2k−1
kmk(m+ 1)k−1.
There are 2k copies of T km, hence the total number of special rectangles of the form
∏k
i=1[xi, yi],
where xi = m+1 or yi = m for some i, is 2km
k(m+1)k−1 (compare the case k = 2 in Section 4.3).
Hence, s(n), the total number of special rectangles will satisfy the following recursively defined
inequality:
s(n) 6 2kmk(m+ 1)k−1 + 2ks(m).
Re-writing, we have
s(n)− 2ks
(n
2
)
6 2k
(n
2
)k (n
2
+ 1
)k−1
,
and applying the binomial theorem, we obtain
s(n)− 2ks
(n
2
)
6 2k
(n
2
)k k−1∑
i=0
(
k − 1
i
)(n
2
)i
;
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finally, applying Proposition 17, we have
s(n) 6 2k
(n
2
)k (
logn+
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
)
ni − 1
2i − 1
)
.
Now the maximum out-degree of any special hyperrectangle is 2k, so e(n) 6 2ks(n); and
ni − 1
2i − 1 6
ni+1 − 1
2i+1 − 1 for all n > 2 and all i > 1. Hence, we have
e(n) 6 2knk
(
logn+
nk−1 − 1
2k−1 − 1
k−1∑
i=1
(
k − 1
i
))
= 2knk
(
logn+ nk−1 − 1) ,
as required. 
There is little related work on interval-based access control for arbitrary dimensions.
Yuan and Atallah (2009), whose work was briefly described in Section 4, stated that their methods
for geo-spatial access control could be generalized to higher dimensions, without providing any
details. Srivatsa, Iyengar, Yin, and Liu (2008) generalized the notion of binary encryption trees
to geo-spatial access control and higher dimensions. The number of keys and the number of key
derivation steps required are O (2k+1 logn) where k is the number of dimensions. The schemes
we describe in this paper are the first in which each user has a single key.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we consider the enforcement of an interval-based access control pol-
icy, which generalizes the temporal and geo-spatial access control policies in the
literature (Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007a; Atallah, Blanton, and Frikken 2007b;
De Santis, Ferrara, and Masucci 2008). Such policies can be enforced using cryptographic
methods, often called key assignment schemes. There are several efficient key assignment
schemes in the literature, in the sense that the amount of storage and the time taken to derive
cryptographic keys is considerably less than that required if standard enforcement schemes are
applied directly. These efficient schemes exist because of the particular structure of the graph
that is used to represent interval-based access control policies. Existing work has used generic
techniques for reducing the diameter of the graph, without considering the particular relationship
between the access control policy and the desired graph.
In this paper we have developed a number of efficient enforcement schemes that have consid-
erable advantages over existing ones. We focus on the development of novel techniques to provide
efficient schemes designed specifically for interval-based access control policies, rather than using
more generic techniques. Our approach enables us to produce, in almost all cases, exact values
for the number of edges and the number of steps required to derive a key, in contrast to existing
work in the literature (as shown by Figure 6). Moreover, we demonstrate that our constructions
can be generalized to higher dimensions, yielding new insights into the efficient cryptographic
enforcement of interval-based access control policies.
One disadvantage of our work in Section 5 is that we assumed that each dimension contained
intervals in Tn for some fixed n. In practical applications, this may not be a reasonable assumption,
and it may be prohibitively expensive to “pad” each dimension and work with T kN , where N =
max {n1, . . . , nk} and ni is the number of points in the ith dimension. One important aspect of
our future work, therefore, will be to try to extend our results in Section 5 for T kn to the more
general case Tn1 × · · · × Tnk .
Perhaps the most interesting area for future work is to consider more expressive access con-
trol policies and their enforcement using cryptographic techniques. At the moment, we consider
intervals defined over a totally ordered set of attributes A. We also intend to consider policies
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where A is some partially ordered set and users and objects are associated with subsets of A. Of
particular interest is the case where A is a powerset defined over some set of attributes, since the
resulting policies would be analogous to those used in ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion (Bethencourt, Sahai, and Waters 2007). We have recently published some preliminary results
in this area (Crampton 2010).
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A Extending our constructions
We now consider what modifications are required to our work to enable the derivation of keys for
all nodes in Tm (rather than just leaf nodes). We do this to demonstrate that we can extend our
constructions to the cases that are considered by previous researchers.
We first consider the following problem. Given a diamond-shaped grid Dm (illustrated in
Figure 10), how can we reduce the diameter of the graph by adding a small number of edges?
Clearly, the number of edges in the grid is (m− 1)2 and the diameter of the graph is 2m− 2 for
the set of edges shown in Figure 10(a). Consider the following construction.
Construction 3
1. Divide D2m into four copies of Dm.
2. Label these copies D
(0,0)
m , D
(0,1)
m , D
(1,0)
m and D
(1,1)
m (bottom to top and left to right, as illus-
trated in Figure 10).
3. For each node in [x, y] ∈ D(1,1)m we define a set of nodes Cx,y, such that∣∣∣Cx,y ∩D(i,j)m ∣∣∣ = 1 and |Cx,y| = 4.
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Specifically, for all i and j, the largest node in D
(i,j)
m that is less than or equal to [x, y] belongs
to Cx,y.
4. For each node [x, y] ∈ D(1,1)m we connect the four nodes in Cx,y together using 4 edges. In
doing this, we can get from any node in Cx,y to another element of Cx,y in a different copy
of Dm in no more than two hops.
5. We now apply this construction recursively to each copy of Dm.
An enforcing edge set for D8 of diameter 3 is shown in Figure 10(b). The dashed lines represent
the edges connecting copies of D2; each copy of D2 is labeled in the manner described above.
(a) The basic edge set
(1,1)
(0,1) (1,0)
(0,0)
(b) An enforcing edge set of diameter 3
Figure 10: D8
From this construction we deduce the recurrence relation
ED(m) = 4
(m
2
)2
+ 4ED
(m
2
)
= m2 + 4ED
(m
2
)
,
where ED represents the number of edges required for Dm. And from this recurrence relation we
can prove by induction that ED(m) = m
2 logm. Let d(m) be the diameter of the graph (Dm, E),
where E is the edge set obtained from the above construction. Then we have d(m) = 2+ d(m/4),
from which we may deduce that d(m) = logm.
We can now construct an enforcing set of edges for Tm. Consider the following construction.
Construction 4
1. Divide T2m into two copies of Tm, labeled T
(0)
m and T
(1)
m and a diamond Dm.
2. For each node [x, y] ∈ Dm define Cx,y to be the following set of nodes:
• [x, y];
• the largest element in T (0)m that is less than [x, y]; and
• the largest element in T (1)m that is less than [x, y].
3. For each node [x, y] ∈ Dm add two edges to connect it to the other two nodes in Cx,y. Hence,
it is now possible to get from any node in Dm to a node in each copy of Tm in one hop.
4. Apply this construction recursively to T
(0)
m and T
(1)
m .
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5. Construct a set of edges for each of D
(0,0)
m , D
(0,1)
m , D
(1,0)
m and D
(1,1)
m .
From this construction we deduce the recurrence relation
ET (m) = 2
m2
4
+ ED
(m
2
)
+ 2ET
(m
2
)
=
1
2
m2 +
1
4
m2(logm− 1) + 2ET
(m
2
)
=
1
4
m2(logm+ 1) + 2ET
(m
2
)
,
where ET (m) denotes the number of edges required for Tm.
Proposition 21 For all n > 2, ET (n) =
1
2n
2 logn.
Proof By inspection, we have ET (2) = 2, so the result holds for n = 2. Now assume that the
result holds for all n < N . Then
ET (N) =
1
4
N2(logN + 1) + 2ET
(
N
2
)
=
1
4
N2(logN + 1) + 2
(
N2
8
(logN − 1)
)
by inductive hypothesis
=
1
2
N2 logN
as required. 
B Multi-key constructions for temporal access control
B.1 The case k = 3
Suppose that m = ab. Then we can treat Tm as a triangle Tb in which the leaf supernodes
are copies of Ta and the non-leaf supernodes are copies of Da. Now any interval [x, y] can be
represented as the union of no more than three intervals [x, z1], [z1 + 1, z2], [z2 + 1, y], where z1
and z2 are multiples of a. Then [z1 + 1, z2] has the form [z
′
1a + 1, z
′
2a], for some integers z
′
1 and
z′2, and can be represented as the interval [z
′
1, z
′
2] in Tb. Figure 11 illustrates T36 split into copies
of T6 and D6. The interval [3, 25], for example, can be represented as [3, 6]∪ [7, 24]∪ [24, 25], and
[7, 24] can be treated as the interval [1, 3] in a copy of T4 comprising interior copies of D6.
Hence, we only require key derivation edges between the “interior” maximal nodes in each
diamond supernode and the nodes in each triangle supernode. An exterior maximal node is of
the form [1, z′1a] or [z
′
2a + 1,m]: [1, z
′
1a] is the union of the intervals [1, a] and [a + 1, z
′
1a]; and
[z′2a+ 1,m] is the union of the intervals [z
′
2a + 1, (b− 1)a] and [(b − 1)a+ 1,m]. In other words,
all intervals corresponding to maximal nodes in an exterior diamond supernode can be treated
as the union of a leaf supernode and an interior diamond supernode. Clearly we can apply this
construction recursively, yielding the following construction.
Construction 5 Let m = a1 . . . ak.
1. Treat Tm as a tree Ta1 comprising supernodes Tm/a1 and Dm/a1 .
2. Mark every node in the upper edges of each copy of Tm/a1 as a special node (as in Construc-
tion 2).
More formally, denote the ith leaf supernode by T
(i)
m/a1
, 1 6 i 6 a1. Then
T
(i)
m/a1
= {[x+ (i − 1)m/a1, y + (i− 1)m/a1] : 1 6 x 6 y 6 m/a1} ,
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and we define the set of special nodes to be
a1−1⋃
i=1
{[x, (i − 1)m/a1, im/a1] : 1 6 x 6 m/a1} ∪
a1−1⋃
i=1
{[im/a1 + 1, y] : 1 6 y 6 m/a1}
3. Mark the maximal node in each interior copy of Dm/a1 as a special node. This set of nodes
has the form {[im/a1 + 1, jm/a1] : 1 < i 6 j < a1} and hence these nodes are in one-to-one
correspondence with Ta1−2 (under the mapping [im/a1+1, jm/a1] 7→ [i−1, j−1]). Construct
a set of key derivation edges for this set of nodes by applying binary decomposition to Ta1−2.
4. If m/a1 > 2, repeat for all leaf supernodes Tm/a1 .
Finally, define every key allocation edge that connects two special nodes to be a key derivation
edge.
The application of this construction to T36 is illustrated in Figure 11. The faint dashed lines
illustrate the recursive partitioning of T36 and copies of T6 into supernodes.
Figure 11: The key derivation graph generated by applying Construction 5 to T36
Now Step 1 adds no more than 2m special nodes6 and Step 2 adds 12 (a1 − 1)(a1 − 2) special
nodes. Hence, the number of special nodes satisfies the inequality
s(m) 6 2m+
1
2
(a1 − 1)(a1 − 2) + a1s
(
m
a1
)
Now for a1 6
√
m and ai+1 6
√
ai we have s(m) 6
5
2m + a1s(m/a1) and we can easily prove
by induction that s(m) 6 52m log logm. By construction, the out-degree of each node in the key
derivation graph is 2, so e(m) 6 5m log logm.
Moreover, the number of hops d(m) satisfies the inequality
d(m) 6
⌈
log(
√
m− 2)⌉+ d(√m) < 1
2
logm+ 1 + d(
√
m).
Hence, we may conclude that d(m) 6 logm+ ⌈log logm⌉.
6In fact, Step 1 adds precisely m/a1 + (a1 − 2)(2m/a1 − 1) +m/a1 special nodes.
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B.2 The case k > 4
For k = 3, we ensure that we can derive keys for the maximal nodes in each diamond supernode
using a single key. When k > 4, we simply require that we can derive keys for the maximal nodes
using k − 2 keys.
Let s(m, k) denote the number of special nodes required to construct a scheme with k keys for
Tm. Then we have
s(m, k) 6 2m+ s(a1 − 2, k − 2) + a1s(m/a1, k)
Consider k = 4: let a1 = m/ logm and ai+1 = ai/ log ai, and recall that the number of special
nodes required by a 2-key scheme for Tm is no greater than m logm. Then we have
s(m, 4) 6 2m+
m
logm
log
(
m
logm
)
+
m
logm
s(logm, 4)
< 3m+
m
logm
s(logm, 4).
From this inequality, we prove by induction that s(m, 4) 6 3m log∗m. Clearly the result holds for
m = 4. Suppose, then, that s(m, 4) 6 3m log∗m for all m < N .
s(N, 4) 6 2N + s
(
N
logN
, 2
)
+
N
logN
s(logN, 4)
6 2N +
N
logN
log
(
N
logN
)
+
N
logN
3 logN log∗(logN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
by inductive hypothesis
< 3N + 3N log(log∗N)
= 3N(1 + log(log∗N))
= 3N log∗N
Hence, we require no more than 6m log∗m edges to construct a 4-key scheme for Tm. We also
have
d(m) 6 ⌈log(m/ logm)⌉+ d(logm) 6 logm− log logm+ 1 + d(logm),
and there are at most ⌈log∗m⌉ recursive steps, so (applying a similar argument to the one used
for k = 3) we have d(m) 6 logm + ⌈log∗m⌉. We summarize the results of this section in the
following theorem, which is stated without proof.
Theorem 22 There exist enforcing sets of edges E1, E2 and E3 such that
• |E1| = 2m logm, the graph (Tm, E1) comprises two disconnected components, and the diam-
eter of (Tm, E1) is ⌊logm⌋;
• |E2| = 5m log logm, the graph (Tm, E2) comprises three disconnected components, and the
diameter of (Tm, E2) is logm+ ⌈log logm⌉;
• |E3| = 6m log∗m, the graph (Tm, E3) comprises four disconnected components, and the
diameter of (Tm, E1) is logm+ ⌈log∗m⌉;
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